on terror" was declared after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), and was the basis for the United States-led military campaign against the al Qaeda terrorist network sponsored by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This same military struggle against obscure, non-state terrorists has since continued-as the George W. Bush administration would have many Americans believe-in the form of the preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003. These two armed conflicts have specific and discrete strategic (and legal) justifications-self-defense against terrorism in the case of Afghanistan, and host of arguments for Iraq, including, inter alia, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and democratic reform. Yet the moral discourse that has been advanced in support of these two conflicts is broad, portraying them as two fronts in the same conflict. "Good versus evil" and "a struggle against violent extremism" are among the language used to describe this broad conflict in moral terms, and which allegedly justifies not only the present wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also any and all future military campaigns against violent extremists. Thus, the question of whether the global war on terror is a "just war" has profound implications; for what is at stake is whether a war, or series of wars, against an ill-defined enemy, anywhere in the world, and for all time, is morally justified.
We seek to elucidate this discussion by systematically applying what one might call "just war principles" to armed conflict that involves nonstate actors. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the broader war on terror, have indeed sparked a renewed scholarly interest in the ethics of armed conflict, as evidenced by several recent books that claim to reappraise, revisit, or otherwise rethink just war theory in light of these developments. 4 While what is broadly understood as the just war tradition predates the advent of the states system, these and other contemporary analyses of the just war nevertheless remain undeniably state centric, or only tangentially touch upon how just war principles apply to non-state or nongovernmental participants of armed conflict. Given the fact that a substantial portion-if not a majority-of contemporary armed conflicts involve at least one non-state actor, we take this to indicate that the role of specifically non-state participants in warfare has been under-studied in the recent literature on the ethics of armed conflict. Therefore, the purpose of this volume is to engage the ethical dilemmas posed specifically by non-state actors to the conduct of armed conflict. Do non-state actors have the right to go to war at all? If not, how does this implicate just war theory as a theory of authority? What are the parameters for seeking the punishment of non-state actors? How might non-state actors be held accountable under relevant international law? How do assumptions about gender subordination in the just war tradition affect how the tradition
